A New Cold War

A New Cold War
The current global polarization bears striking similarities to the early period of the Cold War. In 1947, President Harry Truman announced his doctrine, speaking of “free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation.” He stated that nearly every nation must choose “between two alternative ways of life”: one based on free elections, personal freedom, freedom of speech and religion; the other characterized by political coercion, terror, and oppression by a minority. These were the markers of the deep ideological divide that defined the Cold War’s beginning.
President Truman, like the U.S. presidents who followed him, embodied one of two competing ideological worlds—each symbolizing the opposing geopolitical camps of the time. Then as now, geopolitics took precedence over ideology. Truman cited Greece and Turkey as key examples—neither of which, he noted, were free or democratic at the time.
Today’s renewed global division—this time between the West and countries like China and Russia—is once again framed ideologically as a clash between democracy and autocracy. During the Cold War, there were contested regions that did not clearly fall under the influence of either the U.S. or the Soviet Union. In conflicts such as those in Korea, Vietnam, Angola, Ethiopia, and Afghanistan, as well as in crises like Berlin and Cuba, the superpowers generally avoided direct military confrontation, though they supported opposing groups and supplied arms.
In today’s version of a Cold War, disputed regions remain: Ukraine is a clear example, alongside Taiwan, the South China Sea, and the Middle East. The U.S. continues to adhere to its longstanding principle of avoiding direct military confrontation. However, the ongoing U.S.–China rivalry in the first half of the 21st century is driven not only by economic competition but primarily by geopolitical concerns.
U.S. national security strategies now explicitly refer to “great power competition,” leading some observers to predict that this rivalry could escalate beyond economics to military confrontation. The argument that economic interdependence between the U.S. and China would prevent a military conflict—or even a new Cold War—is not supported by historical precedent. In fact, the level of economic and administrative interconnection between European nations at the beginning of the 20th century was, in many respects, greater than what we’ve seen in the age of globalization since the 1990s. Yet this did not prevent the outbreak of World War I.
Today, the U.S. aims to prevent China from surpassing it—not only as the world’s strongest military power, but also as the most powerful and influential economy. U.S. military spending is more than three times that of China and equals the combined military budgets of the next ten countries—some of which are U.S. allies. The U.S. maintains 800 military bases worldwide; China has just one.
Given this sharp polarization, the ability to address common global challenges—such as health crises, climate change, and the spread of weapons of mass destruction—will be limited. The question arises: where is this conflict headed?
One possible scenario is a renewed U.S. dominance in economic and military terms—or even a military confrontation. In such a context, cooperation on issues like climate change would become increasingly unlikely. Another scenario could involve a new bloc-based world order, resembling that of the original Cold War.
However, most Europeans are reluctant to be drawn into such a strategic—or worse, military—conflict. Sixty percent of Europeans say they prefer to remain neutral in a U.S.–China conflict. In the event of a military escalation, this may not be an unreasonable position.
(Excerpt from the book by Heinz Gärtner, Ideen zum positive Frieden” (“Ideas on Positive Peace”), Delta-Publisher, 2025.

Link to book order:
https://www.deltax.at/produkt/heinz-gaertner-ideen-zum-positiven-frieden/